We consider the problem of aggregating votes cast by a society on a fixed set of issues, where each member of the society may vote for one of several positions on each issue, but the combination of votes on the various issues is restricted to a set of feasible voting patterns. We follow the aggregation framework used by Dokow and Holzman [Aggregation of non-binary evaluations, Advances in Applied Mathematics, 45:4, 487-504, 2010], in which both preference aggregation and judgment aggregation can be cast. We require the aggregation to be independent on each issue, and also supportive, i.e., for every issue, the corresponding component of every aggregator, when applied to a tuple of votes, must take as value one of the votes in that tuple. We prove that, in such a setup, non-dictatorial aggregation of votes in a society of an arbitrary size is possible if and only if either there is a non-dictatorial aggregator for two voters or there is an aggregator for three voters such that, for each issue, the corresponding component of the aggregator, when restricted to two-element sets of votes, is a majority operation or a minority operation. We then introduce a notion of a uniform non-dictatorial aggregator, which is an aggregator such that on every issue, and when restricted to arbitrary two-element subsets of the votes for that issue, it differs from all projection functions. We first give a characterization of sets of feasible voting patterns that admit a uniform non-dictatorial aggregator. After this and by making use of Bulatov's dichotomy theorem for conservative constraint satisfaction problems, we connect social choice theory with the computational complexity of constraint satisfaction by proving that if a set of feasible voting patterns has a uniform non-dictatorial aggregator of some arity, then the multi-sorted conservative constraint satisfaction problem on that set (with each issue representing a different sort) is solvable in polynomial time; otherwise, it is NP-complete.
m j=1 A j ) n ; it is convenient to think of such elementsx as n × m matrices, where x i j is the position of voter i on issue j. An n-ary aggregator is a function F : ( m j=1 A j ) n → m j=1 A j such that X is closed under F , meaning that ifx ∈ X n , then F (x ) ∈ X . If n = 2, then we talk about a binary aggregator, while if n = 3, we talk about a ternary aggregator. Requiring X to be closed under F reflects the notion of rationality of F , while requiring F to be defined on ( m j=1 A j ) n reflects the notion of universality (for a recent presentation of these notions, see, e.g., List [24] ).
A main theme of judgment aggregation theory is to relate properties of the domain X with properties of the aggregator F . An early class of results in this vein are the so-called impossibility theorems, which assert that it is impossible to obtain an aggregator F with certain desired properties, given that the domain X satisfies certain minimal conditions. Such a result is the impossibility theorem of List and Pettit [22, 23] , which asserts that, in the context of judgment aggregation, if the domain contains two propositional variables p and q, and the propositional formulas (p ∧ q) and ¬(p ∧ q), then X has no aggregator that is universal, anonymous, and systematic. Informally, an aggregator is anonymous if it is invariant under permutations of the columns of the input matrices, while an aggregator is systematic if there is a common aggregation rule for all issues (the formal definitions of these two notions will be given in the next section).
Stronger than the impossibility results are the characterization results, where one seeks to find necessary and sufficient conditions for a domain to admit aggregators possessing some desired property. In this article, we study characterizations of domains in the abstract framework of Dokow and Holzman [10, 11] that admit non-dictatorial aggregators, i.e., aggregators that do not always return the vector of positions of some fixed voter. Throughout the article, we assume that aggregators satisfy a much weaker property than systematicity, namely, the property known as independence of irrelevant alternatives or issue-by-issue aggregation (IIA) or, simply, independence. This property is equivalent to the existence of functions f 1 , . . . , f m such that f j : A n j → A j and F (x ) = ( f 1 (x 1 ), . . . , f m (x m )), where x j is the j-th column ofx (a discussion of the notion of independence can be found in the next section). Note that systematicity is the special case of IIA in which f 1 = f 2 = · · · = f m .
Summary of Results.
Here, we follow Szegedy and Xu's idea of deploying the algebraic "toolkit" [31] . All our results assume multi-valued sets of possible votes that may vary from issue to issue.
Firstly, we prove that non-dictatorial aggregation is possible for all societies of some cardinality if and only if a non-dictatorial binary aggregator exists or a non-dictatorial ternary aggregator exists such that on every issue j, the corresponding component f j of the aggregator is a majority operation, i.e., for all x and y, it satisfies the equations f j (x, x, y) = f j (x, y, x ) = f j (y, x, x ) = x, or f j is a minority operation, i.e., for all x and y, it satisfies the equations f j (x, x, y) = f j (x, y, x ) = f j (y, x, x ) = y.
For additional information about the notions of majority and minority operations, see Szendrei [32, p. 24] .
We also show that a domain is totally blocked if and only if it admits no non-dictatorial binary aggregators; this result shows that the notion of a domain being totally blocked is, in a precise sense, a weak form of an impossibility domain and thus it explains why total blockedness appears in several previous characterization results.
After this, we introduce the notion of a uniform non-dictatorial aggregator, which is an aggregator that on every issue, and when restricted to an arbitrary two-element subset of the votes for that issue, differs from all projection functions. The introduction of this notion was motivated by the fact that an aggregator can be non-dictatorial simply by choosing different dictators for two issues. Actually, this fact has also motivated numerous other notions stronger than non-dictatorial aggregators. In the Boolean framework, uniform non-dictatorial aggregators coincide with the ones that are locally non-dictatorial. The latter notion was introduced by Nehring and Puppe [26] (see Section 5) .
We first compare uniform non-dictatorial aggregators to other aggregators with related properties, such as the anonymous aggregators [26] , the StrongDem aggregator of Szegedy and Xu [31] , and the generalized or rolling dictatorship of Grandi and Endriss [14, 16] and of Cariani et al. [7] , respectively. Then, we characterize the sets of feasible voting patterns that admit uniform nondictatorial aggregators.
As a corollary of this characterization, we establish that, in the Boolean framework, a set X of feasible voting patterns admits an aggregator that is locally non-dictatorial of some arity if and only if it admits a ternary anonymous one, a result that, to the best of our knowledge, has not been obtained earlier (note that Nehring and Puppe [26] prove the same result, but with the added hypothesis that the aggregators satisfy monotonicity, and without showing, in the "only if" direction, that the anonymous one is ternary; see Section 5.2).
Finally, by using Bulatov's dichotomy theorem for conservative constraint satisfaction problems [2] [3] [4] , we connect social choice theory with the computational complexity of constraint satisfaction. Specifically, we prove that if a set of feasible voting patterns X has a uniform non-dictatorial aggregator of some arity, then the multi-sorted conservative constraint satisfaction problem on X , in the sense introduced by Bulatov and Jeavons [5] , with each issue representing a sort, is tractable; otherwise, it is NP-complete. We believe that the connection of social choice theory with the constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) may lead to still further characterization results.
Relation to the Conference Version. The previous version of this article in the Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Relational and Algebraic Methods in Computer Science (RAMiCS 2017) [19] did not contain any proofs, because of space limitations. The present journal version, in addition to detailed proofs and several improvements in the presentation, contains this section on motivation and with extended references to the social choice literature, especially to the literature on aggregation theory. Finally, Corollaries 2.8 and 5.11 were also not contained in the conference version.
DEFINITIONS AND PREVIOUS RESULTS

Definitions
In the sequel, we have a fixed set I = {1, . . . ,m} of issues. Let A = {A 1 , . . . , A m } be a family of finite sets, each of cardinality at least 2, representing the possible positions (voting options) on the issues 1, . . . ,m, respectively. If every A j has cardinality exactly 2 (i.e., if for every issue only a "yes" or "no" vote is allowed), we say that we are in the binary or the Boolean framework; otherwise, we say that we are in the non-binary or the non-Boolean framework.
Let X be a non-empty subset of m j=1 A j that represents the feasible voting patterns. We write X j , j = 1 . . . ,m, to denote the j-th projection of X . We assume that X j = A j (we can always ignore elements in A j \ X j ). Note that this does not imply that X = m j=1 A j , since, in general, it does not (necessarily) hold that X = m j=1 X j . Let n ≥ 2 be an integer representing the number of voters. The elements of ( m j=1 A j ) n can be viewed as n × m matrices, whose rows correspond to voters and whose columns correspond to issues. Ifx is such a matrix, we write x i j to denote the entry of the matrix in row i and column j; clearly, x i j stands for the vote of voter i on issue j. The row vectors of such matricesx will be denoted as x 1 , . . . , x n , and the column vectors as x 1 , . . . , x m .
An aggregator of arity n is a function
A j such that X is closed under F , meaning that ifx ∈ X n , then F (x ) ∈ X . As pointed out in the previous section, requiring that X is closed under F reflects the rationality of F , while requiring that F is defined on ( m j=1 A j ) n reflects the universality of F . Actually, universality usually refers to F being definable on X n ; however, it is technically advantageous, and imposes no essential restriction, to assume universality with respect to all possible vectors of votes, even "irrational" ones (for such votes, F may return an arbitrary value).
An aggregator F is called dictatorial on X if there is a number d ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that for everȳ x ∈ X n , we have that F (x ) = x d (i.e., F (x ) is equal to the d-th row ofx).
A set X of feasible voting patterns is called a possibility domain if, for some number n ≥ 2, there exists a non-dictatorial aggregator of arity n. Otherwise, X is called an impossibility domain. Thus, a possibility domain is, by definition, one where aggregation is possible for societies of some cardinality, namely, the arity of the non-dictatorial aggregator.
Following List and Puppe [24] , we define the notions below concerning properties of aggregators on a domain X .
An aggregator F is called anonymous if for every two matricesx,ȳ ∈ X n such that the rows of y 1 , . . . ,y n ofȳ are a permutation of the rows x 1 , . . . , x n ofx, we have that
An aggregator F is called systematic if for every two issues i, j and every two matricesx,ȳ ∈ X n , if x i = y j (i.e., if the i-th column ofx coincides with the j-th column ofȳ), then the i-th coordinate of the vector F (x ) coincides with the j-th coordinate of the vector F (ȳ). In effect, an aggregator is systematic if it arises from a polymorphism of X , that is, a function f such that X is closed under f , where X is viewed as an m-ary relation. As is well-known, polymorphisms play an important role in universal algebra (see Ref. [32] ).
Much weaker than the notion of systematicity is the notion of independence. An aggregator F is called independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) or just independent if, for every issue j and for every two matricesx,ȳ ∈ X n , if x j = y j (i.e., the j-th columns ofx andȳ coincide), then the j-th coordinate of the vector F (x ) coincides with the j-th coordinate of the vector F (ȳ). It can be easily shown that an aggregator F is IIA if and only if for every issue j, there is a function f j : A n j → A j such that for everyx ∈ X n , the j-th coordinate of F (x ) is equal to f j (x j ) (see, e.g., Ref. [27, Lemma 1] ). Thus, an aggregator is systematic if and only if it is IIA and all functions f j are equal. Note also that an IIA aggregator is anonymous if and only if the output of each function f j , 1 ≤ j ≤ m, depends only on the multi-set of the input values. Since the values of F outside X do not matter, we assume in the sequel that for all IIA aggregators, there are functions f j : A n j → A j such that for everyx ∈ ( m j=1 A j ) n (and not just forx ∈ X n ), the j-th component of F (x ) is equal to f j (x j ). Such aggregators will be denoted byf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ). In this setting, it is easy to see that an IIA aggregatorf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ) is dictatorial if and only if there is a d = 1, . . . , n so that for every j = 1, . . . ,m, we have that f j = pr n d , where pr n d is the n-ary projection on the d-th coordinate (for example pr 3 2 (0, 1, 0) = 1). Observe that, lest we can always aggregate non-dictatorially, we have to restrict aggregators to be IIA. Indeed, let x 0 ∈ X . Consider the non-IIA aggregator on X 2 defined by F (x, y) = x, if x x 0 , and F (x, y) = y, otherwise. Obviously, F is non-dictatorial if X contains at least two elements. In other words, the question of the possibility of non-dictatorial aggregation is not meaningful unless we assume independence. So, in the sequel, we assume that aggregators are IIA. Observe, however, that the aggregator F just defined is obviously not anonymous. If we seek to characterize domains that admit anonymous aggregators instead of non-dictatorial ones, then it is meaningful to investigate the case of non-IIA aggregators. This line of research was taken by Nehring and Puppe [26] .
An IIA aggregatorf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ) is supportive or conservative if for everyx ∈ X n , and for every j = 1, . . . ,m, we have that f j (x j ) ∈ {x 1 j , . . . , x n j }. An IIA aggregatorf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ) is Paretian if for everyx ∈ X n , and for every j = 1, . . . ,m, if
In the Boolean framework, the notions of supportiveness and being Paretian are obviously equivalent. However, if more than two voting options are offered for an issue, then the notion of being supportive is in general stronger than being Paretian, but still is a natural assumption to make.
Throughout this article, we assume that aggregators are IIA and supportive.
It is easy to see that X is a possibility domain. Indeed, for every n ≥ 2, the set X has non-dictatorial n-ary aggregators of the form 
and it is a minority operation if for all x and y in A,
We also define what it means for a set to admit a majority operation and a minority operation. Since the arity of an aggregator is the arity of its component functions, a ternary aggregator is an aggregator with components of arity three. Definition 2.3. Let X be a set of feasible voting patterns.
-X admits a majority aggregator if it admits a ternary aggregatorf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ) such that f j is a majority operation on X j , for all j = 1, . . . ,m. -X admits a minority aggregator if it admits a ternary aggregatorf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ) such that f j is a minority operation on X j , for all j = 1, . . . ,m.
Clearly, X admits a majority aggregator if and only if there is a ternary aggregatorf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ) for X such that, for all j = 1, . . . ,m and for all two-element subsets B j ⊆ X j , we have that f j B j = maj, where
Also, X admits a minority aggregator if and only if there is a ternary aggregatorf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ) for X such that, for all j = 1, . . . ,m and for all two-element subsets B j ⊆ X j , we have that f j B j = ⊕, where
It is well-known that in the Boolean framework (in which for all issues only "yes" or "no" votes are allowed), a set X admits a majority aggregator if and only if X is a bijunctive logical relation, i.e., a subset of {0, 1} m that is the set of satisfying assignments of a 2CNF-formula. This result was proved by Schaefer [30] in the context of Boolean constraint satisfaction and, later on, by researchers in social choice theory (see, e.g., Theorem 28 in Ref. [15] ). In social choice theory, domains admitting a majority aggregator are often called median spaces (see, e.g., Ref. [10] ).
It is also well-known that, in the Boolean framework, X admits a minority aggregator if and only if X is an affine logical relation, i.e., a subset of {0, 1} m that is the set of solutions of linear equations over the two-element field. Again, this result was proved by Schaefer [30] ) in the context of Boolean constraint satisfaction. It should be noted that affine domains play an important role in the work of Dokow and Holzman [10] ; furthermore, in social choice theory, non-affine domains are also known as even-number-negatable domains (see, e.g., Ref. [21] ). , a), (a, a, c) , (c, c, a)} admits a majority aggregator.
To see this, letf = ( f , f , f ), where f : {a, b, c} → {a, b, c} is as follows:
Clearly, if B is a two-element subset of {a, b, c}, then f B = maj. So, to show that X admits a majority aggregator, it remains to show thatf = ( f , f , f ) is an aggregator for X . In turn, this amounts to showing thatf is supportive and that X is closed under f . It is easy to check thatf is supportive. To show that X is closed under f , let
The only case that needs to be considered is when x, y, and z are pairwise distinct. Several subcases need to be considered. For instance, if Clearly, if B is a two-element subset of {a, b, c}, then f B = ⊕. So, to show that X admits a minority aggregator, it remains to show thatf = ( f , f , f ) is an aggregator for X . In turn, this amounts to showing thatf is supportive and that X is closed under f . It is easy to check thatf is supportive. To show that X is closed under f , let
is also in X . The only case that needs to be considered is when x, y, and z are distinct, say,
Since f is not affected by permutations of the input, the proof is complete.
So far, we have given examples of possibility domains only. Next, we give an example of an impossibility domain in the Boolean framework.
Example 2.6. Let W = {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)} be the 1-in-3 relation, i.e., the set of all Boolean tuples of length 3 in which exactly 1 occurs.
We claim that W is an impossibility domain. It is not hard to show that W is not affine and that it does not admit a non-dictatorial binary aggregator. Theorem 3.7 in the next section implies that W is an impossibility domain.
Every logical relation X ⊆ {0, 1} m gives rise to a generalized satisfiability problem in the context studied by Scheafer [30] . We point out that the property of X being a possibility domain in the Boolean framework is not related to the tractability of the associated generalized satisfiability problem. Concretely, the set W in Example 2.6 is an impossibility domain and its associated generalized satisfiability problem is the NP-complete problem Positive 1-in-3-Sat. As discussed earlier, the Cartesian product W × W is a possibility domain. Using the results in Ref. [30] , however, it can be verified that the generalized satisfiability problem arising from W × W is NP-complete. At the same time, the set {0, 1} m is trivially a possibility domain and gives rise to a trivially tractable satisfiability problem. Thus, the property of X being a possibility domain is not related to the tractability of the generalized satisfiability problem arising from X .
Nonetheless, in Section 5 we establish the equivalence between the stronger notion of X being a uniform possibility domain and the weaker notion of the tractability of the multi-sorted generalized satisfiability problem arising from X , where each issue is taken as a different sort. Actually, we establish this equivalence not only for satisfiability problems but also for constraint satisfaction problems whose variables range over arbitrary finite sets.
Previous Results
There has been a significant body of earlier work on possibility domains. Here, we summarize some of the results that relate the notion of a possibility domain to the notion of a set being totally blocked, a notion originally introduced in the context of the Boolean framework by Nehring and Puppe [25] . As stated earlier, a set X of possible voting patterns is totally blocked if, intuitively, "any position on any issue can be deduced from any position on any issue"; this intuition is formalized by asserting that a certain directed graph G X associated with X is strongly connected. The precise definition of this notion is given in Section 4.
In the case of the Boolean framework, Dokow and Holzman [10] obtained the following necessary and sufficient condition for a set to be a possibility domain. The necessity of this condition is also contained in Dietrich and List [8] . -X is a possibility domain. -X is affine or X is not totally blocked.
For the non-Boolean framework, Dokow and Holzman [11] found the following connection between the notions of totally blocked and possibility domain.
Theorem B (Dokow and Holzman [11, Theorem 2]). Let X be a set of feasible voting patterns. If X is not totally blocked, then X is a possibility domain; in fact, there is a non-dictatorial n-ary
aggregator, for every n ≥ 2.
Note that, in the case of the Boolean framework, Theorem B was stated and proved as Claim 3.6 in Ref. [10] .
For the non-Boolean framework, Szegedy and Xu [31] obtained a sufficient and necessary condition for a totally blocked set X to be a possibility domain.
Theorem C (Szegedy and Xu [31, Theorem 8] ). Let X be a set of feasible voting patterns that is totally blocked. The following statements are equivalent.
-X is a possibility domain. -X admits a non-dictatorial ternary aggregator.
Note that, in the case of the Boolean framework, Theorem C follows from the preceding Theorems A and B, the latter in the Boolean framework.
A binary non-dictatorial aggregator can also be viewed as a ternary one, where one of the arguments is ignored. By considering whether or not X is totally blocked, Theorems B and C imply the following corollary, which characterizes possibility domains without involving the notion of total blockedness; to the best of our knowledge, this result has not been explicitly stated previously.
Corollary 2.7. Let X be a set of feasible voting patterns. The following statements are equivalent.
(1) X is a possibility domain. (2) X admits a non-dictatorial ternary aggregator.
For the rest of this Section only, we drop the assumption that aggregators should be supportive (conservative) and we assume them to be just Paretian (unanimous). Note that in the non-Boolean framework, as remarked earlier, these two notions are not equivalent. The following result follows easily from extant results (Theorem B above and Theorem 8 for the Paretian case in Ref. [31] ), although again, to the best of our knowledge, it has not been explicitly mentioned before.
m}. Then the following statements are equivalent: (1) X is a possibility domain (in the Paretian sense). (2) X admits a non-dictatorial (Paretian) aggregator of arity at most max(d, 3).
CHARACTERIZATION OF POSSIBILITY DOMAINS
Our first result is a necessary and sufficient condition for a set of feasible voting patterns to be a possibility domain. (1) X is a possibility domain. (2) X admits a non-dictatorial binary aggregator or it admits a majority aggregator or it admits a minority aggregator.
Theorem 3.1 is stronger than the preceding Corollary 2.7 because, unlike Corollary 2.7, it gives explicit information about the nature of the components f j of non-dictatorial ternary aggregators f = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ), when the components are restricted to a two-element subset B j ⊆ X j of the set of positions on issue j, information that is necessary to relate results in aggregation theory with complexity theoretic results (besides the three projections, there are 61 supportive ternary functions on a two element set). Observe also that iff = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ) is a binary aggregator, then every component f j is necessarily a projection function or the function ∧ or the function ∨, when restricted to a two-element subset B j ⊆ X j (identified with the set {0, 1}). So, for binary aggregators, the information about the nature of their components is given gratis.
Only the direction 1 =⇒ 2 of Theorem 3.1 requires proof. Toward this goal, we first introduce a new notion, that of monomorphic aggregators, and give three lemmas, which we then use to prove Theorem 3.1.
Let X be a set of feasible voting patterns and letf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ) be an n-ary aggregator for X .
Definition 3.2.
We say thatf is locally monomorphic if for all indices i and j with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, for all two-element subsets B i ⊆ X i and B j ⊆ X j , for every bijection д : B i → B j , and for all column vectors Intuitively, the above definition says that no matter how we identify the two elements of B i and B j with 0 and 1, the restrictions f i B i and f j B j are equal as functions. Notice that in the definition, we are allowed to have i = j, which implies that if in a specific B j we interchange the values 0 and 1 in the arguments of f j B j , then the bit that gives the image of f j B j is flipped.
It follows immediately from the definitions that if an aggregator is dictatorial, then it is locally monomorphic. For binary aggregators, the converse is true. Indeed, assume thatf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ) is a binary locally monomorphic aggregator for X . We claim thatf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ) is dictatorial on X . To see this, fix a coordinate f i and consider a pair (a, b) ∈ X 2 i with a b. By conservativeness,
The case where f i (a, b) = b is entirely analogous. As we shall see next, a ternary locally monomorphic aggregator need not be dictatorial. In fact, majority aggregators and minority aggregators are locally monomorphic, but, of course, they are not dictatorial.
Example 3.3. Let X be a set of feasible voting patterns that admits a ternary aggregatorf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ) that is either a majority or a minority aggregator.
Indeed, suppose thatf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ) is a minority aggregator, i.e., for every j with 1 ≤ j ≤ m and every two-element set B j ⊆ X j , we have that f j B j = ⊕. Let i, j be such that 1 ≤ i, j, ≤ m, let B i = {a, b} ⊆ X i , and let B j = {c, d} ⊆ X j (we make no assumption for the relation, if any, between a, b, c, d). There are exactly two bijections д and д from B i to B j , namely,
An analogous statement holds for д . Since i, j were arbitrary, we conclude thatf is locally monomorphic.
The proof for the case whenf is a majority aggregator is similar. We now present the first lemma needed in the proof of Theorem 3.1, which gives a sufficient condition for all aggregators of all arities to be locally monomorphic.
Lemma 3.4. Let X be a set of feasible voting patterns. If every binary aggregator for X is dictatorial on X , then, for every n ≥ 2, every n-ary aggregator for X is locally monomorphic.
Proof. Under the hypothesis that all binary aggregators are dictatorial, the conclusion is obviously true for binary aggregators. For the induction step, suppose that the conclusion is true for all (n − 1)-ary aggregators, where n ≥ 3. Consider an n-ary aggregatorf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ) and a pair (B i , B j ) of two-element subsets B i ⊆ X i and B j ⊆ X j . To render the notation less cumbersome, we will take the liberty to denote the two elements of both B i and B j as 0 and 1. Assume now, toward a contradiction, that there are a column-vector (a 1 , . . . , a n ) with a i ∈ {0, 1}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a "copy" of this vector belonging to B n i , and another copy belonging to B n j , such that f i (a 1 , . . . , a n ) f j (a 1 , . . . , a n ). Since n ≥ 3, by the pigeonhole principle applied to two holes and at least three pigeons, there is a pair of coordinates of (a 1 , . . . , a n ) that coincide. Without loss of generality, assume that these two coordinates are the two last ones, i.e., a n−1 = a n . We now define an (n − 1)-ary aggregatorд = (д 1 , . . . ,д m ) as follows: given n − 1 voting patterns (x i 1 , . . . , x i m ), i = 1, . . . , n − 1, define n voting patterns by just repeating the last one, and then for all k = 1, . . . ,m, define
It is straightforward to verify thatд is an (n − 1)-ary aggregator on X that is not locally monomorphic, which contradicts the inductive hypothesis. Proof. The proof will be given by induction on s. The induction basis s = 2 is given by hypothesis. Before delving into the inductive step of the proof and for the purpose of making the intuition behind it clearer, let us mention the following fact whose proof is left to the reader. This fact illustrates the idea for obtaining a non-dictatorial aggregator of lower arity from one of higher arity.
Fact. Let A be a set and let f : x 2 , a 3 ), a 3 ) . Then, by distinguishing cases as to the value of f (x 1 , x 2 , a 3 ), it is easy to verify that д is supportive; however, д is not a projection function because д (a 1 , a 2 ) = a 2 , whereas д(a 1 , a 3 
For the inductive step of the proof of Lemma 3.5, we assume that for every n ≥ 2 and every n-ary aggregatorf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ), there is a d ≤ n such that for every integer j ≤ m and every subset B j ⊆ X j with at most s − 1 elements, the restriction f j B j is equal to pr n d . Fix such an nary aggregatorf and fix an integer d, obtained by applying the induction hypothesis to s − 1 and f . Assume, without loss of generality, that d = 1. We will show that for every j ≤ m and for every subset B j ⊆ X j of cardinality at most s, we have that f j B j = pr n 1 , the n-ary projection function on d = 1. We may assume that s ≤ n, lest the induction hypothesis applies.
Assume toward a contradiction that there exists an integer j 0 ≤ m and row vectors a 1 , . . . , a n in X such that the set B j 0 = {a 1 j 0 , . . . , a n j 0 } has cardinality s and
By supportiveness, there exists i 0 ∈ {2, . . . , n} such that
, . . . , a 
. . ,y n j ) ∈ X n j as follows:
and finally define: f 
is an aggregator on X , because, in case x i ∈ X for all i = 1, . . . , s − 1, then all row vectors y 1 , . . . ,y n defined above belong to X (each is either some x i or some a i ).
It is obvious that f
It is easy to see that for the correspondingŷ i j 0
, it holds that
It follows that f
cannot be a projection function, which contradicts the inductive hypothesis (assumed to hold for everyf ); this concludes the proof of Lemma 3.5.
We bring now into the picture some basic concepts and results from universal algebra; we refer the reader to Szendrei's monograph [32] for additional information and background. A clone on a finite set A is a set C of finitary operations on A (i.e., functions from a finite power of A to A) such that C contains all projection functions and is closed under arbitrary compositions (superpositions). The proof of the next lemma is straightforward. Lemma 3.6. Let X be a set of feasible voting patterns. For every j with 1 ≤ j ≤ m and every subset B j ⊆ X j , the set C B j of the restrictions f j B j of the j-th components of aggregatorsf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ) for X is a clone on B j .
Post [29] classified all clones on a two-element set (for more recent expositions of Post's pioneering results, see, e.g., Ref. [32] or [28] ). One of Post's main findings is that if C is a clone of conservative functions on a two-element set, then either C contains only projection functions or C contains one of the following operations: the binary operation ∧, the binary operation ∨, the ternary operation ⊕, or the ternary operation maj.
Using all of the above, we are now ready to prove Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. As stated earlier, only the direction 1 =⇒ 2 requires proof. In the contrapositive, we will prove that if X does not admit a majority or a minority aggregator, and it does not admit a non-dictatorial binary aggregator, then X does not have an n-ary non-dictatorial aggregator, for any n. Toward this goal, and assuming that X is as stated, we will first show that the hypothesis of Lemma 3.5 holds. Once this is established, the conclusion will follow from Lemma 3.5 by taking s = max{|X j | : 1 ≤ j ≤ m}.
Given j ≤ m and a two-element subset B j ⊆ X j , consider the clone C B j . If C B j contained one of the binary operations ∧ or ∨, then X would have a binary non-dictatorial aggregator, a contradiction. If, on the other hand, C B j contained the ternary operation ⊕ or the ternary operation maj, then, by Lemma 3.4, X would admit a minority or a majority aggregator, a contradiction as well. So, by Post's result mentioned above, all elements of C B j , no matter what their arity is, are projection functions. By Lemma 3.4 again, since X has no binary non-dictatorial aggregator, we have that for every n and for every n-ary aggregatorf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ), there exists an integer d ≤ n such that for every j ≤ m and every two-element set B j ⊆ X j , the restriction f j B j is equal to pr n d , the n-ary projection on the d-th coordinate. This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
In the case of the Boolean framework, Theorem 3.1 takes the stronger form of Theorem 3.7 below. Although this result for the Boolean framework is implicit in Dokow and Holzman [10] , we give an independent proof. 
(1) X is a possibility domain. (2) X is affine (i.e., X admits a minority aggregator) or X admits a non-dictatorial binary aggregator.
Proof. Only the direction 1 =⇒ 2 requires proof. Assume that X is a possibility domain in the Boolean framework. By Theorem 3.1, X admits either a majority or a minority aggregator or X has a non-dictatorial binary aggregator. Since we are in the Boolean framework, this means that X is affine or X is bijunctive or X has a non-dictatorial binary aggregator. If X has at most two elements, then X is closed under ⊕, hence, X is affine. So, it suffices to show that if X is bijunctive and has at least three elements, then X has a non-dictatorial binary aggregator. To prove the latter, fix an elementā = (a 1 , . . . , a m ) ∈ X . Define the following binary aggregator, wherex = (x 1 , . . . , x m ) and y = (y 1 , . . . ,y m ) are arbitrary elements of X :
fā (x,ȳ) = (maj(x 1 , y 1 , a 1 ), . . . , maj(x m , y m , a m ) ).
First, observe thatfā is indeed an aggregator for X . Since X is closed under maj, all we have to prove is thatfā is supportive. But this is obvious, because, for j ≤ m, if x j = a j or y j = a j , then maj(x j , y j , a j ) = x j or maj(x j , y j , a j ) = y j . If x j a j and y j a j , then x j = y j , hence, maj(x j , y j , a j ) = x j = y j . Now, consider anā ∈ X such that at some coordinate i, a i = 1 and at some coordinate j, a j = 0 (suchā exists, because X has at least three elements). Observe thatfā i = ∨, by Equation (5) and because a i = 1. Similarly,fā j = ∧ because a j = 0. Therefore,fā i fā j .
CHARACTERIZATION OF TOTAL BLOCKEDNESS
As discussed in the preceding section, much of the earlier work on possibility domains used the notion of a set being totally blocked. Our next result characterizes this notion in terms of binary aggregators and, in many respects, "explains" the role of this notion in the earlier results about possibility domains. We begin by giving the precise definition of what it means for a set X of feasible voting patterns to be totally blocked. We will follow closely the notation and terminology used by Dokow and Holzman [11] .
Let X be a set of feasible voting patterns.
Elements of a box B that belong also to X will be called feasible evaluations within B (in the sense that each issue j = 1, . . . ,m is "evaluated" within B).
-Let K be a subset of {1, . . . ,m} and let x be a tuple in j ∈K B j .
We say that x is a feasible partial evaluation within B if there exists a feasible evaluation y within B that extends x, i.e., x j = y j , for all j ∈ K; otherwise, we say that x is an infeasible partial evaluation within B.
We say that x is a B-Minimal Infeasible Partial Evaluation (B-MIPE) if x is an infeasible partial evaluation within B and if for every j ∈ K, there is a b j ∈ B j such that changing the j-th coordinate of x to b j results into a feasible partial evaluation within B.
-We define a directed graph G X as follows.
The vertices of G X are the pairs of distinct elements u, u in X j , for all j = 1, . . .m. Each such vertex is denoted by uu j . Two vertices uu k , vv l with k l are connected by a directed edge from uu k to vv l if there exists a 2-sub-box B = m j=1 B j , a set K ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}, and a B- We now give the following definition: [11] ). We say that X is totally blocked if the graph G X is strongly connected, i.e., every two distinct vertices uu k , vv l are connected by a directed path (this must hold even if k = l). 1), (1, 0) }. Both G X and G X have two vertices for each issue j, namely 01 j and 10 j , where G X has j = 1, 2, 3 and G X has j = 1, 2. In the figures below, we use undirected edges between two vertices uu k and vv l to denote the existence of both uu k → vv l and vv l → uu k .
Definition 4.1 (Dokow and Holzman
Since X is in the Boolean framework, the only 2-sub-box B is X 1 × X 2 × X 3 . The B-MIPEs of X are (0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1), and (1, 1, 0) . Consider 01 1 , 01 2 of G X . Due to (0, 1, 1), 01 1 → 01 2 , and due to (1, 0, 1), 01 2 → 01 1 . Also, due to (0, 0, 0), 01 i → 10 j , ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} : i j. The rest of the cases are left to the reader.
Observe that G X is strongly connected and that it admits no binary non-dictatorial aggregator, as expected by Theorem 4.3 below, but it admits the ternary minority aggregator.
On the other hand, the only 2-sub-box B of X is X 1 × X 2 , since it is also in the Boolean framework. The B -MIPEs of X are (0, 0) and (1, 1) . Easily now, 01 1 ↔ 10 2 and 10 1 ↔ 01 2 .
Observe that G X is not strongly connected (it is not even connected) and, as expected by Theorem 4.3 below, it admits binary non-dictatorial aggregators, namely, (∧, ∨) and (∨, ∧).
This notion is a generalization to the case where the A j 's are allowed to have arbitrary cardinalities of a corresponding notion for the Boolean framework (every A j has cardinality 2), originally given in Ref. [25] . To give the intuition behind the above rather technical definition, assume that we are in the Boolean case, so the only 2-sub-box is m j=1 X j . Observe that an MIPE x is a vector of votes on some of the issues, which however cannot be extended to a vector of votes on all issues in X , i.e., cannot be extended to a "rational" voting pattern on all issues, and is a minimal partial such vector, in the sense that deleting the vote of a single issue from x, we get a partial vector of votes that can be extended to a total rational one. Now observe that if uu k , vv l with k l are connected by an edge, then there is a minimal way to fix the votes on some issues other than k, l so that any rational total voting pattern that takes these fixed values and has the value u on issue k, should take the value v on issue l. Therefore, as Dokow and Holzman [10] write, "Roughly speaking, it requires that the limitations on feasibility embodied in the set X make it possible to deduce any position on any issue from any position on any issue, via a chain of deductions."
We are now ready to state the following result, which-quite remarkably, we believecharacterizes total blockedness as a weak form of impossibility, for any number of issues and any possible set of votes for each issue. (1) X is totally blocked. (2) X has no non-dictatorial binary aggregator.
Observe that Theorem 3.7 is also an immediate consequence of Theorem A and Theorem 4.3. In view of Theorem B by Dokow and Holzman [11] , only the direction 1 =⇒ 2 of Theorem 4.3 requires proof. Nevertheless, we prove both directions of Theorem 4.3 for completeness.
Proof. We start with direction 1 =⇒ 2. Consider at first two vertices uu k , vv l of G X (with k l) connected by an edge uu k → vv l . Then there exists a 2-sub-box B = m j=1 B j with B k = {u, u } and
Claim. For every binary aggregatorf
To prove the Claim, first observe that by the minimality of x within B, if we flip x k from u to u , or if we flip x l from v to v, then we get, in both cases, respective feasible evaluations within B. Therefore, there are two total evaluations e and e in X ∩ B such that -e k = u and -e s = x s for s ∈ K, s k (in particular e l = v ), and -e l = v and -e s = x s for s ∈ K, s l (in particular, e k = u).
If we assume, toward a contradiction, that f k (u, u ) = u and f l (v, v ) = v , we immediately have that the evaluationf (e, e ) := ( f 1 (e 1 , e 1 ), . . . , f m (e m , e m )) extends (x j ) j ∈K , contradicting the latter's infeasibility within B. This completes the proof of the Claim and we now return to the proof of Theorem 4.3.
From the Claim, we get that if
, where uu k →→ vv l means that there is path from uu k to vv l in the graph G X . Also, since by supportiveness
From this, it immediately follows that if G X is strongly connected, then every binary aggregator of X is dictatorial.
We will now prove Direction 2 =⇒ 1 of Theorem 4.3, namely, that if X is not totally blocked, then there is a non-dictatorial binary aggregator (this part is contained in Ref. [11, Theorem 2]-Theorem B above). Since G X is not strongly connected, there is a partition of the vertices of G X into two mutually disjoint and non-empty subsets V 1 and V 2 so that there is no edge from a vertex of V 1 toward a vertex in V 2 . We now define anf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ), where f k : A 2 k → A k , as follows:
In other words, for two differing values u and u in X k , the function f k is defined as the projection on the first coordinate if uu k ∈ V 1 , and as the projection onto the second coordinate if uu k ∈ V 2 ; we also define
Notice thatf is non-dictatorial because V 1 and V 2 are not empty. All that remains to be shown is that X is closed underf , i.e., if e = (e 1 , . . . , e m ), e = (e 1 , . . . , e m ) ∈ X are two totally feasible evaluations, then f (e, e ) := ( f 1 (e 1 , e 1 ) ,
Let L = {j = 1, . . . ,m | e j e j }. For an arbitrary j ∈ L, define vertex j (e, e ) to be the vertex uu j of G X , where u = e j and u = e j .
If nowf (e, e ) = e or iff (e, e ) = e , then obviously Condition (7) is satisfied. So assume that f (e, e ) e andf (e, e ) e .
Also, toward showing Condition (7) by contradiction, assumē
Define now a 2-sub-box B = (B j ) j=1, ...,m as follows:
where a j is an arbitrary element e j of X j (the latter choice is only made to ensure that |B j | = 2 in all cases). Because of Conditions (9) and (10), we have thatf (e, e ) is a total evaluation infeasible within B. Toward constructing a B-MIPE, delete coordinates off (e, e ) one after the other (and as far as it can go), while taking care not to destroy infeasibility within B. Let K ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} be the subset of coordinate indices that remain at the end of this process. Then the partial evaluation
is infeasible within B. Therefore, lest e or e extends x = ( f j (e j , e j )) j ∈K (not permissible because the latter partial evaluation is infeasible), there exist k, l ∈ K such that e k e k and e l e l (12) and also
we have, by Conditions (6), (12) , (13), and (14) , that vertex k (e, e ) = uu k ∈ V 1 and vertex l (e, e ) = vv l ∈ V 2 (15) and, by Conditions (6), (13) , and (14), we get that
which by Condition (15) is a contradiction because we get an edge from V 1 to V 2 . This completes the proof of Theorem 4.3. Before proceeding further, we point out that the three types of non-dictatorial aggregators in Theorem 3.1 are, in a precise sense, independent of each other. It is easy to see that X is closed under the binary operation ∧, but it is not closed under the ternary majority operation maj or the ternary minority operation ⊕.
Thus, X is a possibility domain admitting a non-dictatorial binary aggregator, but not a majority aggregator or a minority aggregator. , 1), (0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0), (1, 1, 1 )} of solutions of the equation x + y + z = 1 over the two-element field.
It is easy to see that X is closed under the ternary minority operation ⊕, but it is not closed under the ternary majority operation maj. Moreover, Dokow and Holzman [10, Example 3] pointed out that X is totally blocked; hence, Theorem 4.3 implies that X does not admit a non-dictatorial binary aggregator.
Thus, X is a possibility domain admitting a minority aggregator, but not a majority aggregator or a non-dictatorial binary aggregator. Example 4.6. Consider the set X = {(0, 1, 2), (1, 2, 0), (2, 0, 1), (0, 0, 0)}. This set was studied in Ref. [11, Example 4] . It can be shown that X admits a majority aggregator. To see this, consider the ternary operatorf = ( f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ) such that f j (x, y, z) is the majority of x, y, z, if at least two of the three values are equal, or it is 0 otherwise. Notice that in the latter case, the value 0 must be one of the x, y, z, so this operator is indeed supportive. It is easy to verify that X is closed under ( f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ) . Moreover, if one of the f j 's is restricted to a two-element domain (i.e., to one of {0, 1}, {(1, 2)}, {0, 2}), then it must be the majority function by its definition, sof is indeed a majority aggregator on X .
Dokow and Holzman argued that X is totally blocked, hence, Theorem 4.3 implies that X does not admit a non-dictatorial binary aggregator.
Next, we claim that X does not admit a minority aggregator. Toward a contradiction, assume it admits the minority aggregatorд = (д 1 , д 2 , д 3 ) . By applyingд to the triples (0, 1, 2), (1, 2, 0), (0, 0, 0) in X , we infer that the triple (д 1 (0, 1, 0), д 2 (1, 2, 0), д 3 (2, 0, 0) ) must be in X . By the assumption that this aggregator is the minority operator on two-element domains, we have that д 1 (0, 1, 0) = 1 and д 3 (2, 0, 0) = 2, so X contains a triple of the form (1, д 2 (1, 2, 0), 2); however, X contains no triple whose first coordinate is 1 and its third coordinate is 2, so we have arrived at a contradiction.
Thus, X is a possibility domain admitting a majority aggregator, but not a minority aggregator or a non-dictatorial binary aggregator.
Observe that the possibility domains in Examples 4.4 and 4.5 are in the Boolean framework, while the possibility domain in Example 4.6 is not. This is no accident because it turns out that in the Boolean framework, if a set admits a majority aggregator, then it also admits a non-dictatorial binary aggregator. This property is shown as a claim in the proof of Theorem 3.7. Note also that this explains why admitting a majority aggregator is not part of the characterization of possibility domains in the Boolean framework in Theorem 3.7.
UNIFORM POSSIBILITY DOMAINS
In this section, we connect aggregation theory with multi-sorted constraint satisfaction problems. Toward this goal, we introduce uniform non-dictatorial aggregators, which is a stronger notion of non-dictatorial aggregators.
Uniform Non-Dictatorial Aggregators
Definition 5.1. We say that an aggregatorf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ) for X is uniform non-dictatorial if for every j = 1, . . . ,m and every two-element subset B j ⊆ X j , we have that f j B j is not a projection function.
Obviously, such an aggregator is not dictatorial. In the literature, several other ways to strengthen the notion of being non-dictatorial have been suggested, mainly for the Boolean case. We mention these below and outline their relation to the notion of uniform non-dictatorial aggregator.
An n-ary aggregatorf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ), in the Boolean framework, is locally dictatorial if there exists a j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and a d ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that f j = pr n d (see Ref. [26] ). It can be easily seen that, in the Boolean framework,f is locally non-dictatorial if and only if it is uniform nondictatorial. As mentioned in Section 2, an aggregatorf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ) is anonymous if the output of each f j depends only on the multi-set of its input values. It is easy to see that an anonymous aggregator is also uniform non-dictatorial; the converse, however, is not necessarily true. The same holds for the StrongDem aggregator, defined by Szegedy and Xu in Ref. [31] : for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, for all B j ⊆ X j , and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exist a 1 j , . . . , a n j ∈ B j , such that, the
. . , a n j ) does not depend on the value of x i j (this aggregator is defined in the non-Boolean framework). It is again easy to see that such an aggregator is uniform nondictatorial. On the other hand, consider the uniform non-dictatorial (and systematic) aggregator f = ( f , . . . , f ) such that f is a minority operator.f is not StrongDem: consider f on input a, b, c ∈  {0, 1}. If a = b, then if c a, f (a, b, c) = c; else, it is equal to a. If a b, then, if c = a, f (a, b, c) = b, else, it is equal to a. Thus, there are no values for a, b in order for f to be independent of c.
Finally, it is interesting to compare aggregators that are not uniform non-dictatorial with generalized dictatorshis, defined by Grandi and Endriss [14, 16] (or rolling dictatorships; see Ref. [7] ). An n-ary aggregatorf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ) for X is a generalized dictatorship if there exists a function д : X n → {1, . . . , n} such that, for anyx = (x 1 , . . . ,
The notions of generalized dictatorships and not uniform non-dictatorial aggregators differ. Informally, note that: (i) a generalized dictatorship refers to elementsx ∈ X n , whereas not uniform non-dictatorial aggregators to issues j and (ii) for an aggregatorf not to be a generalized dictatorship, we only need one elementx such thatf is not dictatorial on this element, whereas for an aggregator to be uniform non-dictatorial, we need all issues to be aggregated in a non-dictatorial way. Formally, the class of aggregators that are not generalized dictatorships is neither a subclass nor a superclass of the uniform non-dictatorial ones. Indeed, recall the aggregator of Example 2.1. It is not a generalized dictatorship, since for eachx ∈ X n , it introduces two dictators (the d-th voter for the first l issues and the d -th for the rest) and, obviously, it is not a uniform non-dictatorial aggregator, since all of its components are projections. On the other hand, let X = {(0, 0), (1, 1)} ⊆ {0, 1} 2 and letf = (maj, maj), which is obviously a uniform non-dictatorial aggregator. It is not hard to see thatf is a generalized dictatorship.
We now turn our attention to sets of feasible voting patterns that admit uniform non-dictatorial aggregators.
Definition 5.2. Let X be a set of feasible voting patterns. We say that X is a uniform possibility domain if X admits a uniform non-dictatorial aggregator of some arity.
The next example shows that the notion of a uniform possibility domain is strictly stronger than the notion of a possibility domain.
Example 5.3. Let W = {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)} be the 1-in-3 relation, considered in Example 2.6. As seen earlier, the Cartesian product W × W is a possibility domain. We claim that W × W is not a uniform possibility domain in the sense of Definition 5.2. Indeed, since W is an impossibility domain, it follows easily that for every n, all n-ary aggregators of W × W are of the form
It is obvious that every set X that admits a majority aggregator or a minority aggregator is a uniform possibility domain. The next example states that uniform possibility domains are closed under Cartesian products. ( f 1 , . . . , f l ) be a uniform non-dictatorial aggregator for X and let ( f l +1 . . . , f m ) be a uniform non-dictatorial aggregator for X . Then,
Characterization of Uniform Possibility Domains
We now provide a useful characterization for uniform possibility domains. We begin with a notational point.
Let B be an arbitrary two-element set, viewed as the set {0, 1}, and consider the binary logical operations ∧ and ∨ on B (since we will always deal with both these logical operations concurrently, it does not matter which element of B we take as 0 and which as 1). For notational convenience, we define two ternary operations on B as follows:
We now first state and subsequently prove the following result. 
Before the proof of Theorem 5.5, we give several preliminaries. We start with the following lemma: 
Proof. Let x l j , l = 1, . . . , k, j = 1, . . . ,m be a k × m matrix whose rows are in X . Since theh i , i = 1, . . . , n are k-ary aggregators, we conclude that for all i = 1, . . . , n,
We now apply the aggregatorf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ) to the n × m matrix
. . , n, j = 1, . . . ,m, which concludes the proof.
Using the above lemma, we will assume below, often tacitly, that various tuples of functions obtained by superposition of aggregators with other aggregators, like projections, are aggregators as well.
We now prove three lemmas: For notational convenience, we introduce the following definition:
Definition 5.9. Letf andд be two aggregators on X . Letf д be the ternary aggregatorh = (h 1 , . . . , h m ) defined by: Proof of Theorem 5.5. The directions (1) ⇒ (2) and (3) ⇒ (1) are obvious. Also, the equivalence of (3) and (4) immediately follows from Lemma 5.7. It remains to show (2) ⇒ (3). For a two-element subset B j ⊆ X j , let C B j be the clone (Lemma 3.6) of the restrictions f j B j of the j-th components of aggregatorsf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ). By Post [29] , we can easily get that C B j contains one of the operations ∧, ∨, maj, and ⊕. Therefore, easily, for all j, B j , there is a ternary aggregatorf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ) (depending on j, B j ) such that f j B j is one of the ∧ (3) , ∨ (3) , maj, and ⊕. Now letf 1 , . . . ,f N be an arbitrary enumeration of all ternary aggregators each of which on some issue j and some twoelement B j is one of the ∧ (3) , ∨ (3) , maj, and ⊕, and such that thef l 's cover all possibilities for j, B j .
As a ternary operationh such that uniformly for each j, B j , the restriction h j B j belongs to the set {∧ (3) , ∨ (3) , maj, ⊕} we can take, by Lemma 5.10,
which concludes the proof.
To end thus subsection, we prove a result that connects locally non-dictatorial and anonymous aggregators in the Boolean framework. Nehring and Puppe [26, Theorem 2] proved that a domain admits a monotone and locally non-dictatorial aggregator if and only if it admits a monotone anonymous one. An n-ary aggregatorf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ) is monotone if, for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, it satisfies the following condition:
As a corollary of our Theorem 5.5, we show not only that the monotonicity requirement can be dropped but also that in the "only if" direction, the anonymous aggregator can be proved to be ternary. Specifically, we prove: Corollary 5.11. Let X be a set of feasible voting patterns in the Boolean framework. The following statements are equivalent.
(1) X admits a locally non-dictatorial aggregator of some arity n. (2) X admits an anonymous ternary aggregator.
Proof. Recall that, in the Boolean framework, the notions of locally and uniform nondictatorial aggregators coincide. Thus, Condition (1) of the Corollary is equivalent with X being a uniform possibility domain. The result now follows by Condition (4) of Theorem 5.5.
Connection with Constraint Satisfaction Problems
To state our result that connects the property of X being a uniform possibility domain with the property of tractability of multi-sorted constraint satisfaction problems, we first introduce some notions following closely Refs [5] and [3] .
As before, we consider a fixed set I = {1, . . . ,m}, but this time I represents sorts. We also consider a family A = {A 1 , . . . , A m } of finite sets, each of cardinality at least 2, representing the values the corresponding sorts can take.
-Let (i 1 , . . . , i k ) be a list of (not necessarily distinct) indices from I . A multi-sorted relation over A with arity k and signature
The signature of such a multi-sorted language R will be denoted σ (R). -A multi-sorted constraint language Γ over A is a set of multi-sorted relations over A.
Definition 5.12 (Multi-sorted CSP)
. Let Γ be a multi-sorted constraint language over a family A = {A 1 , . . . , A m } of finite sets. The multi-sorted constraint satisfaction problem MCSP(Γ) is the following decision problem.
An instance of MCSP(Γ) is a quadruple (V , A, δ, C), where V is a finite set of variables; δ is a mapping from V to I , called the sort-assignment function (v belongs to the sort δ (v)); C is a set of constraints where each constraint C ∈ C is a pair (s, R), such that s = (v 1 , . . . ,v k ) is a tuple of variables of length k called the constraint scope; R is a k-ary multi-sorted relation over A with signature (δ (v 1 ), . . . , δ (v k )), called the constraint relation.
The question is whether a value-assignment exists, i.e., a mapping ϕ : V → m i=1 A i , such that, for each variable v ∈ V , we have that ϕ (v) ∈ A δ (v ) , and for each constraint (s, R) ∈ C, with s = (v 1 , . . . ,v k ), we have that the tuple (ϕ (v 1 ), . . . , ϕ (v k )) belongs to R.
A multi-sorted constraint language Γ over A is called conservative if for all sets A j ∈ A and all subsets B ⊆ A j , we have that B ∈ Γ (as a relation over A j ).
If X ⊆ m j=1 A j is a set of feasible voting patterns, then X can be considered as a multi-sorted relation with signature (1, . . . ,m) (one sort for each issue). We write Γ cons X to denote the multisorted conservative constraint language consisting of X and all subsets of every A j , j = 1, . . . ,m, the latter considered as relations over A j .
If the sets A j are equal to each other and |I | = 1, i.e., if there is no differentiation between sorts, then MCSP(Γ) is denoted the constraint satisfaction problem CSP(Γ). If the sets of votes for all issues are equal, then it is possible to consider a feasible set of votes X as a one-sorted relation (all issues are of the same sort). In this framework, and in case all A j 's are equal to {0, 1}, we have that CSP(Γ cons X ) coincides with the problem introduced by Schaefer [30] , which he called the "generalized satisfiability problem with constants" and denoted by SAT C ({X }). Note that the presence of the sets {0} and {1} in the constraint language amounts to allowing constants, besides variables, in the constraints.
Schaefer [30] proved a prototypical dichotomy theorem for the complexity of the generalized satisfiability problem with constants. Bulatov [3, Theorem 2.16] proved a dichotomy theorem for conservative multi-sorted constraint languages, which in our setting reads: Dichotomy Theorem (Bulatov) . If for any j = 1, . . . ,m and any two-element subset B j ⊆ X j , there is either a binary aggregatorf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ) such thatf j B j ∈ {∧, ∨} or a ternary aggregatorf = ( f 1 , . . . , f m ) such thatf j B j ∈ {maj, ⊕}, then MCSP(Γ cons X ) is solvable in polynomial time; otherwise, it is NP-complete.
We now state the following dichotomy theorem. Proof. The tractability part of the statement follows from Bulatov's Dichotomy Theorem and item (3) of Theorem 5.5 (observing that x ∧ y = ∧ (3) (x, x, y) and similarly for ∨ and using Lemma 5.6), whereas the completeness part follows from Bulatov's Dichotomy Theorem and item (2) of Theorem 5.5.
We end this section with the following example:
Example 5.14. Let Y = {0, 1} 3 \ {(1, 1, 0)} be the set of satisfying assignments of the clause (¬x ∨ ¬y ∨ z) and let Z = { (1, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1) , (0, 0, 0)} be the set of solutions of the equation x + y + z = 0 over the two-element field.
We claim that Y and Z are uniform possibility domains; hence, by Example 5.4, the Cartesian product X = Y × Z is also a uniform possibility domain. From Theorem 5.13, it follows that MCSP(Γ cons X ) is solvable in polynomial time. However, the generalized satisfiability problem with constants SAT C ({X }) (equivalently CSP(Γ cons X )) is NP-complete. Indeed, in Schaefer's [30] terminology, the set Y is Horn (equivalently, it is coordinate-wise closed under ∧); however, it is not dual Horn (equivalently, it is not coordinate-wise closed under ∨), nor affine (equivalently, it does not admit a minority aggregator) nor bijunctive (equivalently, it does not admit a majority aggregator). Therefore, by coordinate-wise closure under ∧, we have that Y is a uniform possibility domain. Also, Z is affine, but not Horn, nor dual Horn or bijunctive. So, being affine, Z is a uniform possibility domain. The NP-completeness of SAT C ({X }) (equivalently, the NP-completeness of CSP(Γ cons X )) follows from Schaefer's dichotomy theorem [30] , because X is not Horn, dual Horn, affine, or bijunctive.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article, we used algebraic tools to investigate possibility domains. We also established a connection between the stronger notion of a uniform possibility domain and multi-sorted constraint satisfaction. Our emphasis was structural, an approach that we believe has its own interest. However, structural characterizations are also useful in studying aggregation theory from an algorithmic point of view. For an example, given a family A = {A 1 , . . . , A m } and a subset X ⊆ m j=1 A j as input, adopting a terminology used in computational complexity theory, we call meta-problems the following two questions:
(i) Is X a possibility domain? (ii) Is X a uniform possibility domain?
If it is assumed that X is given in the input by listing explicitly its elements, then it was recently shown that both problems are polynomially solvable (Kirousis et al. [20] ). However, if X is given implicitly in a succinct way (e.g., as the set of satisfying assignments of a given Boolean formula), then the upper bound for the meta-problems is higher. The exact complexity of the aforementioned meta-problems with X represented succinctly remains to be investigated. A closely related algorithmic problem is the question of the safety of the agenda, i.e., the question of whether all functions F : ( m j=1 A j ) n → m j=1 A j that belong in a given class (for example all functions satisfying certain requirements) are aggregators of X , i.e., F [X n ] ⊆ X . For X given as the set of satisfying truth assignments of a Boolean formula, this problem has been shown to be Π P 2 -complete for various classes of functions by Endriss et al. [13] . As it is observed in that work, contrary to the safety question that requires that all functions in the given class are aggregators, the two possibility questions above are questions of existence of an aggregator that belongs to a given class, namely, the non-dictatorial functions or the uniformly non-dictatorial functions, respectively.
